Explaining the Democratic Anchorage of Governance Networks by Skelcher, C et al.
Explaining the Democratic Anchorage 
of Governance Networks
Evidence from Four European Countries
Chris Skelcher
University of Birmingham
Erik-Hans Klijn
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Daniel Kübler
University of Zurich
Eva Sørensen 
Roskilde University
Helen Sullivan
University of Birmingham
ABSTRACT
Advances in understanding the democratic anchorage of gov-
ernance networks require carefully designed and contextually 
grounded empirical analysis that take into account contextual 
factors. The article uses a conjectural framework to study the 
impact of the national democratic milieu on the relationship 
between network governance and representative institutions in 
four European countries: the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark. The article shows that the distinc-
tion between majoritarian and consensus democracy as well 
as the varying strength of voluntary associations are important 
contextual factors that help explain cross-national differences in 
the relationship between governance networks and representative 
institutions. We conclude that a context of weak associationalism 
in majoritarian democracies facilitates the instrumentalization 
of networks by government actors (United Kingdom), whereas 
a more complementary role of governance networks prevails in 
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consensus democracies (Switzerland). however, in consensus 
democracies characterized by a context of strong associationalism 
(the Netherlands and Denmark), the spread of governance net-
works in public policy making is likely to lead to more substantial 
transformations of the democratic processes.
In recent decades, the role and function of governance networks—defined as 
“public policy making and implementation through a web of relationships 
between government, business and civil society actors” (Klijn, 2008, p. 
511)—has attracted considerable attention. In the 1990s, a first generation of 
governance network research explained how this form could be distinguished 
from hierarchical and market approaches and analyzed how and under what 
conditions it contributed to the production of effective governance. Recently, 
a second generation of research has examined the democratic impact of 
governance networks and the extent to which they have “democratic anchor-
age,” that is, a system of metagovernance regulated by elected politicians 
(Sørensen & Torfing, 2005). However, most empirical research into the 
democratic consequences of governance networks has been undertaken in the 
context of a single country (Skelcher, 2007). The absence of cross-national 
comparison means that scholars are unable to establish the extent to which 
there are regional or global uniformities (e.g., whether network governance 
inevitably reduces transparency of public policy) or, conversely, whether the 
institutionalized norms and practices of democracy in individual countries 
have a mediating effect (e.g., by fostering greater citizen engagement in one 
country rather than another).
This article reports on an initial comparative cross-national study of the 
democratic consequences of governance networks. It was designed both to 
generate new knowledge and to stimulate colleagues to undertake similar 
multicountry research. Cross-national comparative research is important for 
the study of governance networks and democracy, as in other fields, because 
it helps increase the critical edge of scholarship (Blondel, 2005). It challenges 
researchers by questioning the findings and taken-for-granted assumptions 
from single-country studies and helps the field move from generalized 
statements to a more refined perspective that can accommodate variation in 
the institutionalized features of “what democracy means” and “how we do 
democracy” in different countries.
Our comparative research strategy starts from a consideration of the 
relationship between governance networks and representative democracy. 
We focus on representative democracy because it is the ideal underpinning 
the institutional arrangements in most countries claiming to be democratic, 
including the four countries that we study. We use a conjectural framework 
to formulate the possible general relationships between governance networks 
and representative democracy and then refine these into propositions that refer 
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to the democratic milieu in each of our case study countries: Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. By democratic milieu, 
we mean the collectively shared meanings and practices of democracy in that 
country, which is, as we discuss, a somewhat broader concept than the more 
commonly used idea of “political culture.” Then, we present a country-by-
country analysis within this overall framework and end by drawing compara-
tive conclusions concerning the relationship between democratic milieu and 
the democratic anchorage of governance networks.
FoUR CoNjECTURES—AN ANAlyTiCAl FRAmEwoRK
The analytical framework is based on four conjectures about the relation-
ships between representative democracy and governance networks (Klijn & 
Skelcher, 2007). Conjectures are provisional theories that offer a plausible 
explanation of the research problem and provide a basis from which further 
investigation and theorizing can proceed. The use of conjectures provides a 
helpful way of exploring a problem in which there are limited data or incom-
plete understandings of the variables involved and their relationships. The 
current empirical knowledge about the democratic anchorage of governance 
networks is such that the use of conjectures seems appropriate. In sum, there 
are four conjectures about the relationship between governance networks 
and representative democracy: namely, the incompatibility conjecture, the 
complementarity conjecture, the transitional conjecture, and the instrumental 
conjecture (see Table 1).
The Incompatibility Conjecture
The incompatibility conjecture posits that representative democracy and 
governance networks conflict because each is predicated on a different set of 
institutional rules. Sørensen (2006) identified four issues in which representa-
tive democracy and governance networks collide. First, governance networks 
challenge the sovereign power of the elected body because they depend on 
a high level of autonomy. Second, governance networks are constituted on a 
functional and not a territorial logic of representation. Third, public admin-
istrators tend to become policymakers in and through their participation in 
governance networks. Fourth, governance networks undermine the classical 
institutional separation between the public and the private sphere in traditional 
theories of representative democracy by bringing together stakeholders from 
state, market, and civil society.
This approach to governance networks emphasizes the closed and compart-
mentalized nature of decision making in separate policy sectors and the limited 
accessibility to these by nonspecialized and poorly organized interest groups. 
The relatively closed and sector-divided character of the decision making in 
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governance networks means that it is primarily sector specialists and other 
experts who participate in the networks at the expense of elected politicians 
(Heisler, 1974; Koppenjan, Ringeling, & te Velde, 1987). Consequently, the 
incompatibility conjecture focuses on the way governance networks interfere 
with the principles of the primacy of politics and the political accountability 
of ministers and other elected, executive officeholders.
The Complementarity Conjecture
The second conjecture suggests that governance networks engage more actors 
in the policy process than the institutions of representative democracy. As 
such, it can be seen as a means to enhance the level of citizen participation in 
representative democracy. This kind of stakeholder involvement is viewed as 
valuable due to a new complexity of the problems that modern governance 
processes address (Pierre & Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1988). There are two types 
of complexity. The first is a function of the issues facing governments such 
as environmental problems, security, and labor market issues (Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004). In the second, new policy agendas are superimposed on the earlier 
cleavages in society around which constitutional arrangement in advanced 
liberal states were designed (Lijphart, 1999). Among these new cleavages are 
religion, ethnicity, cultural orientation, and sexuality. All tend to challenge 
the notions of shared citizenship that are the cornerstone of legitimacy of 
representative democracy.
Governance networks are viewed as a valuable flexible institutional design 
to mediate the relationship of representative democracy with citizens and other 
parties. Hence, governance networks provide quasigovernmental institutions 
within which different groups can take direct part in decision-making pro-
cesses that directly affect them in close collaboration with public actors. By 
doing so, governance networks are said to contribute to democracy in several 
ways (Fung & Wright, 2001; Papadopoulos, 2000). First, the creation of new 
institutions offers greater opportunities for participation in all phases of the 
policy process. Thereby they help to raise the level of public engagement as 
well as the level of information that governments have about the citizens’ 
actual needs and preferences. Second, governance networks negotiate out-
comes that transcend partial preferences. Finally, governance networks help 
to build social capital and political efficacy government (McLaverty, 2002). 
The complementary view thus sees governance networks as a valuable addi-
tion to representative democracy.
The Transitional Conjecture
This conjecture proposes a general transformation of the governance pro-
cesses in Western democracies that affects the functioning of representative 
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democracy in fundamental ways. Governance processes increasingly take the 
form of complicated negotiation processes in which public policy problems are 
ill-defined, require novel solutions, affect many values, and draw on knowledge 
that is dispersed (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Theories of deliberative democ-
racy are seen as a central contribution to develop a new interactive form of 
democracy that relies on the active involvement of citizens and other societal 
actors in order to obtain legitimacy (Papadopoulos, 2003). The current transition 
phase inevitably produces tensions between old and new forms of democratic 
governance. This tension emerges among other things as a tension between 
representative democracy and governance networks (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). 
Elected politicians fear that interactive decision making threatens their primacy 
as decision makers while governance networks view governments as a threat 
toward their autonomy and capacity for self-governance.
The transitional conjecture argues that this tension can be reduced through 
a reformulation of the roles of elected politicians from being sovereign rul-
ers to becoming metagovernors that frame self-governing processes in a 
way that gives an overall direction and promotes the democratic quality of 
self-governing processes (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Sørensen, 2006). From 
the transition perspective, democracy becomes more a societal model than a 
representational model. Democracy becomes a process of deliberation that 
has to be organized and guided carefully to enhance its open character and 
supported by multiple forms of accountability. In the transitional conjecture, 
democracy is a design task to be implemented in real life practice of gover-
nance networks. It is both a high ideal but also a pragmatic task.
The Instrumental Conjecture
The instrumental conjecture views governance networks as a medium through 
which powerful governmental actors can increase their capacity to shape and 
deliver public policy in a complex world. Governance networks provide an 
instrument to structure the inputs to and outcomes from the policy process so 
that their alignment with dominant agendas is increased. Theoretically, the 
instrumental approach can be located either in a notion of local elite strategies 
or the wider debate about changing forms of social regulation in a neoliberal 
context. In either case, the instrumental perspective starts from the premise 
that the interests of governmental actors are relatively immutable and exist 
prior to any wider engagement with stakeholders. Governance networks 
provide a means of reinforcing these dominant interests (through the input 
structure) and realizing them (through the output structure). In contrast, both 
the complementary and transitional approaches assume that interests are 
transitive, being refined and redefined through dialogue and deliberation be-
tween elected politicians and their officials, on the one hand, and the various 
publics, on the other.
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In terms of this conjecture, governance networks offer a means for elected 
politicians to realize their policy platforms through the application of gover-
nance networks in an instrumental fashion. For example, the use of such net-
works to promote vertical linkages that cut across multiple tiers of government 
can enhance local delivery of national policy intent. Governance networks 
provide resources to enable government to extend and reproduce its policy 
agenda into a new arena and enhance the possibilities of realizing its broader 
goals (Le Galès, 2001). In this conjecture, accountability is secured by the 
strong involvement of political office holders who remain responsible. Other 
accountability measures (such as performance management) are designed to 
support the accountability of the central political stakeholder.
The Power of Elected Politicians
The four conjectures each provide their own understanding of the relation-
ship between governance networks and elected politicians. With regard to the 
incompatibility and instrumental conjectures, they both assume that power 
is associated with the authority of elected politicians who make strategic 
decisions that entail a cascade of lower-order decisions for other actors in 
the network. This is either because elected politicians are part of representa-
tive institutions that aggregate the will of the citizens (as is argued by the 
incompatibility conjecture) or because elected politicians are endowed with 
qualities that enable them legitimately to act as principals shaping the in-
centive structures in governance networks (as is argued by the instrumental 
conjecture). The remaining two conjectures portend different views regarding 
the power of elected politicians. The complementarity conjecture considers 
that while ultimate decision authority remains with elected politicians, gov-
ernance networks facilitate the sharing of this authority with various societal 
groups who, in turn, provide elected politicians with support, knowledge, 
and implementation capacity. This exchange between elected politicians and 
societal groups is seen as a basis for the enhancement of civic engagement and 
of pluralism in policy making. Finally, the transitional conjecture emphasizes 
that actors in governance networks strongly depend on each other and that 
this situation strengthens veto powers rather than power to achieve positive 
goals. Thus, elected politicians are certainly not the only powerful actor in 
governance networks and not necessarily the most powerful ones. Their power 
is dissolved and relocated from the institutions of representative democracy 
to the governance network itself.
DEmoCRATiC miliEU AS AN ExpRESSioN oF CoNTExT
The four conjectures are useful in sharpening theoretical thinking and in 
guiding empirical research into the relationship between governance networks 
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and representative democracy. However, it is obvious that they are largely 
insensitive to contextual elements that may influence the relationship between 
governance networks and representative democracy and thus the likeliness of 
the various conjectures to occur in different settings.
Democratic Milieus and the Four Conjectures
There is a long strand of research in comparative political sociology to show 
that the relationship between the state and civil society varies across national 
borders (Badie & Birnbaum, 1994). Any cross-national examination of the 
relationship between societal groups and elected politicians must, therefore, 
be able to single out the influence that the nature of the national context might 
have on this relationship. We capture this contextual influence via the notion 
of “democratic milieu,” which points to the collectively shared meanings and 
practices attributed by the involved actors to the features of the organization 
or institution with which they are associated. This captures something of the 
legacy of historically rooted institutions located in a specific spatial or policy 
setting, as well as the possibilities emergent in new practices (Farrelly & 
Skelcher, 2010). In addition, it concerns the ways in which their organization 
or institution relates to and is conceived to interact with other organizations 
and institutions that make up the national polity. Therefore, cross-national 
variations of democratic milieu need to account for differences regarding the 
interactions between these two actor categories and their respective organiza-
tions or institutions.
Lijphart’s (1999) distinction between consensus and majoritarian patterns 
of democracy enables the operationalization of cross-national variations of the 
democratic milieu. Lijphart argued that democracies should be distinguished 
by looking at variables that tend, on the one hand, to favor majoritarian deci-
sion making thanks to concentration of power or, on the other hand, require 
consensual decision making due to power being shared between a plurality of 
different actors. The relevance of Lijphart’s distinction for the question under 
scrutiny here is clear: In majoritarian democracies, power is concentrated 
within representative institutions—hence, lies with elected politicians—while 
in consensus democracies, power is more dispersed not only within representa-
tive institutions but also between representative institutions and societal actors 
such as interest groups. With respect to the relationships between governance 
networks and representative institutions, we can expect that in majoritarian 
democracies, the (traditionally strong) power of elected politicians is more at 
stake than in consensual democracies in which one is used to shared power 
between elected politicians and other societal actors. In other words, we can 
assume that the described incompatibility and instrumental conjectures are 
more likely to be found in majoritarian democracies, while the complementar-
ity and transitional conjectures are more likely in consensual democracies.
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Further, we argue that the level of social capital is a crucial characteristic 
of the democratic milieu. Putnam (1993) argued that the nature of the civic 
community is important to democracy in the sense that strong engagement 
of citizens in secondary associations (i.e., organizations outside state institu-
tions) tends to foster values and behavior that are crucial to making democracy 
work, namely political equality, solidarity, trust, and tolerance. So the general 
strength of the associational nexus in a given society can also be assumed to 
shape relationships between governance networks (as they involve nonstate 
actors) and representative institutions. A context of strong associationalism 
confers governance networks an independent power base that enables them to 
resist control and direction from representative institutions. Instead, a context 
characterized by associational weakness puts representative institutions into 
advantage. Hence, we propose that in a democratic milieu characterized by 
strong associationalism governance networks will more likely be “at eye 
level” with representative institutions, with whom they can either be in conflict 
(incompatibility conjecture) or negotiate effectively to transform decision 
making and redefine democratic practice (transitional conjecture). On the other 
hand, in a context of weak associationalism, it will be easier for representative 
institutions to dominate governance networks (instrumental conjecture) or 
steer them in a way to engage civil society more fully in public policy making 
(complementarity conjecture). Taken together, these considerations suggest 
that four types of democratic milieus should be distinguished, in which the 
four conjectures are more or less likely to prevail (see Table 2).
Four Countries and Their Democratic Milieu
From the previous considerations, clear hypotheses can be formulated regard-
ing contextual influences on the relationship between governance networks and 
representative institutions in the four countries under scrutiny here: the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, Denmark, and the Netherlands. We selected these four 
countries because they provide sufficient variety to enable comparison within 
the model set out, and in each, the authors had been investigating these issues 
in their own nationally oriented and comparative research projects.
Regarding patterns of democracy, Lijphart argued that the United Kingdom 
and its Westminster model is a good example of a majoritarian democracy and 
that Switzerland lies at the opposite pole as a typical consensus democracy 
Table 2. Democratic milieus and the Four Conjectures
 Associationalism
Pattern of democracy Weak Strong
Majoritarian Instrumental conjecture Incompatibility conjecture
Consensual Complementarity conjecture Transitional conjecture
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(1999, p. 250). Denmark can be classified as a consensual democracy with a 
distinctively Scandinavian culture of consensus and structures for conciliation. 
The Netherlands is more difficult to position. According to Lijphart, it has 
gradually moved away from the consensual style since the 1970s (1999, p. 
256), which is all the more remarkable as most other countries in continental 
Europe (including Denmark) have moved in the opposite direction in the same 
period. But other authors have argued that the dominant style is still very 
consensual and oriented toward negotiation (Hendriks & Toonen, 2000). It 
is also clear that the Netherlands, with its proportional representation, coali-
tion governments, and tradition of consensus is a far weaker example of a 
majoritarian democracy than the United Kingdom. However, we still regard 
the Netherlands as more majoritarian than Denmark. This classification is cor-
roborated by a recent analysis that also found Denmark to be more consensual 
than the Netherlands (Vatter & Bernauer, 2009, p. 352).
To measure the strength of associationalism in these four countries, we 
follow the approach used by recent cross-national studies on membership in 
voluntary organizations (Dekker & van den Broek, 2005; Schofer & Fourcade-
Gourinchas, 2001). We use item B13-19 in the European Social Survey 2006, 
in which respondents were asked whether, in the previous 12 months, they had 
worked in an organization or association that was neither a political party nor 
an action group to determine the average national ratio of active membership in 
voluntary associations. For all the 26 countries covered in the 2006 European 
Social Survey, 14 percent of the respondents declared active involvement in 
voluntary associations in the 12 months before the survey. While the results 
for the United Kingdom (9%) and Switzerland (13%) are below this overall 
average, the results for Denmark (25%) and the Netherlands (24%) are clearly 
above. The four countries under scrutiny can hence be considered to present 
four distinct democratic milieus (see Table 3).
THE FoUR CoUNTRiES CompARED
The empirical analysis in this article uses an expert informant approach. Each 
country case is written by a scholar with extensive experience of the literature 
Table 3. Democratic milieus of Countries Under Scrutiny
 Associationalism
Pattern of democracy Weak Strong
Majoritarian United Kingdom
Netherlands
Denmark
Consensual Switzerland
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on and research into governance networks and democracy in each country. The 
brief was to write a case study that used the available evidence to discuss the 
origins of governance networks, how they relate to the democratic milieu, and 
the role of elected politicians in networks and a conclusion that relates back 
to the four conjectures. Given space constraints, the sections are inevitably 
brief and are intended to provide an overview of the key features of what are 
quite complex processes in each country. References offer additional evidence 
and access to the domestic debates regarding the evolution and relationship 
between governance networks and representative democracy.
United Kingdom
origins of Governance Networks
The significance of governance networks in the United Kingdom was identi-
fied by Marsh and Rhodes (1992) and their collaborators in studies of the 
structured incorporation of business, labor, and other special interest groups in 
national-level policy formulation. The period of Conservative government in 
the 1980s and 1990s not only dislocated these embedded patterns of relation-
ships but also began a process of building local-level collaboration in policy 
implementation in which business and citizen interests were given greater 
weight relative to local government through their formal incorporation into 
new institutions of governance (Skelcher, 2004).
Since the late 1990s, there has been a substantial increase in stakeholder 
engagement with government at (and more recently between) all levels of 
government. Newman (2001) located the momentum for governance net-
works within the discourse of modernization, a New Labour project to recast 
political, economic, social, and cultural relations in UK society. A broad pro-
modernization coalition promotes the widespread use of governance networks. 
This coalition reflects congruence between the interests of national government 
in promoting collaborative and inclusive policy making, managers who see 
advantages in terms of their increased authority and discretion, and political 
actors who recognize the opportunities of finding new ways of engaging with 
local communities (Stoker, 2004; Sullivan, 2004).
Governance networks are often consolidated into a partnership, that is, 
a board or committee that forms the node in each wider network (Lowndes 
& Skelcher, 1998). Partnerships cover a wide range of public policy issues, 
including urban regeneration, crime reduction, health improvement, envi-
ronmental sustainability, and supporting asylum seekers and refugees. The 
proliferation of governance networks across the public policy landscape 
has led to complaints from civil society and business who have experienced 
considerable difficulties in mustering the capacity to respond to all of the 
potential partnership opportunities (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 
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2006; Sullivan, 2008). Nonetheless, policymakers’ appetite for governance 
networks has not abated, with increasing attention being paid to developing 
strategic level networks whose role is to determine and deliver local policy 
outcomes via formalized agreements with national government.
The relationship to the English Democratic milieu
The United Kingdom fits neatly into Lijphart’s (1999) description of a majori-
tarian system. It is a unitary state in which power remains concentrated in the 
hands of the center affording national representative institutions significant 
influence. This pattern has repeated itself in the devolved administrations in 
Scotland and Wales from 1999. Importantly, the constitutional status of local 
government is not safeguarded, and there is a long tradition of central govern-
ment intervention to reshape the governance of local affairs (Stewart, 2000). 
In this context, the development of governance networks can be understood 
within the terms of the instrumental conjecture with local governance networks 
providing a key route for the delivery of national policy objectives.
Governance networks or partnerships seldom require national legislation 
and are formed with little public debate. A powerful incentive to their creation 
has been the creation by national government of special funds, accessible only 
by partnerships of public, business and civil society actors. National policy also 
emphasizes the engagement of stakeholders in governance networks, including 
special funding for the capacity building of community representatives. The need 
for this kind of intervention could be attributed to the relatively weak associational-
ism in the United Kingdom, although its impact has been variable (Taylor, 2003). 
In keeping with the instrumental conjecture, governance networks in the United 
Kingdom have traditionally been subject to minimal constitutional safeguards 
(Skelcher, Mathur, & Smith, 2005). The strongest forms of accountability are to 
higher levels of government, for public funding, and the delivery of performance 
targets. But, in contrast, general democratic oversight is limited.
However, the UK case also provides evidence to support the complementary 
conjecture. Stakeholder engagement is based on a view of society segmented 
into groups organized around different interests and an understanding of de-
mocracy that consists of these interests being directly represented in public 
policy making rather than aggregated and mediated by elected politicians. 
Such stakeholders are understood to be structured in terms of business, non-
profit, and community sectors, the latter being further divisible on locational, 
ethnicity, identity, faith, and other grounds. However the ability of governance 
networks to deliver improved engagement is limited. Problems arise from the 
way “publics” are constituted by the state for inclusion in governance net-
works (Barnes, Newman, Knops, & Sullivan, 2003; Taylor, 2003) and from 
the processes of incorporation that can result when citizen actors come into 
contact with state-led institutions (Lowndes & Sullivan, 2004).
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The Power of Elected Politicians in Governance Networks
Research evidence records widespread disconnection between local politi-
cians and local partnerships (Geddes, 2006; Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, 2006). A strong managerialist discourse locates partnerships as part 
of an implementation structure rather than as policy-making bodies (Skelcher 
et al., 2005). Consequently, elected politicians are framed as higher order 
decision makers (metagovernors) in relation to lower order partnerships 
in keeping with the features of the instrumental conjecture. The resulting 
structural gap enables public managers to exercise considerable discretion, 
including over the design of the institution, its forms of democratic anchor-
age, and the definition of the publics to be included (Barnes et al., 2003). 
In practice, this metagoverning role was quite weak until the mid-2000s 
when a national reappraisal of the role of elected local politicians resulted 
in national policy endorsement of their role as strategic leaders of local 
partnerships (e.g., Communities and Local Government, 2006; Sullivan, 
2008). This shift generated mixed reactions from other stakeholders, many 
of whom acknowledge the primus inter pares role of local government but 
are also apprehensive about what they perceive to be a resurgence of local 
government dominance.
conclusion
The predominant aspects of the democratic milieu that this case illustrates are 
those of the informal constitution that can be changed on a pragmatic basis. 
The United Kingdom is not a constitutional polity. The institutions of gover-
nance are not designed with reference to universal democratic principles. In a 
unitary state, where local institutions are not protected by a constitution, this 
structure means that there is considerable scope for national government to 
change and adapt as it sees fit. Hence, the instrumental conjecture predomi-
nates in our analysis.
But alongside this is also the complementary conjecture. There is clear 
evidence of the opening up of local decision making to a wider spread of 
actors, even if there are difficulties in this process. The combination of in-
strumental and complementary is not accidental. Modernization as a political 
strategy requires the reshaping of local governmental institutions to affect both 
enhanced delivery of public policy and greater legitimacy from stakeholders. 
The resultant governance networks and their partnership nodes provide the 
constitutional flexibility to enable both the managerialization necessary for 
the policy delivery and participation necessary for legitimation. This process 
happens under the broad oversight of representative democratic institutions at 
local level, expressed through their managers and with limited direct involve-
ment by elected local politicians.
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Switzerland
origins of Governance Networks
The Swiss state is generally considered the prototype of a weak state (Badie 
& Birnbaum, 1994). As a corollary, governance networks have always played 
an important role in policy making, both with respect to formulation and 
implementation. At the national level, corporatist delegation of state authority 
to private interest governments (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985) is a long-standing 
feature in many policy fields, ranging from the regulation of vocational 
education to various aspects of agricultural policy. At the subnational level, 
and especially in social policy, there is an equally long-standing tradition of 
subsidiarity, featuring the autonomous delivery of public services by nonprofit 
organizations subsidized by the state (Bütschi & Cattachin, 1993).
These traditions have strongly evolved since the 1980s, in the wake of a 
neoliberal reform agenda. Private interest governments have been dismantled 
in many sectors, transforming corporatist entrenchments into more pluralist 
patterns of policy making (see Mach, 2007; Wagemann, 2005), while public- 
private partnerships have emerged as a core element for the delivery of public 
services (Schedler, 2000). Consequently, state authorities at both national and 
subnational levels have taken a more proactive role in their collaboration with 
nonprofit organizations (Bütschi & Cattachin, 1993). This shift has strength-
ened the role of state agencies in governance networks, vis-à-vis business or 
civil society associations.
The relationship to the Swiss Democratic milieu
Switzerland has a consensus democracy working in a culturally heterogeneous 
and fractionalized society. In addition, the Swiss polity is characterized by 
extensive direct democracy, which has brought about additional mechanisms 
that aim to integrate and pacify potential opposition (Neidhart, 1970). As a 
consequence, policy formulation at all state levels is characterized by negotia-
tion and the search for compromise among a multitude of societal groups both 
outside and within representative institutions before final decisions are made 
in popular votes (see Sciarini, 2007). This climate is favorable to governance 
networks (see Kriesi, 1995). The role of governance networks is thus best 
understood within the complementarity conjecture, supporting existing ar-
rangements by extending consociational relationships into new policy fields 
outside the traditional realms of political negotiation.
The second element of the Swiss democratic milieu, namely, weak associa-
tionalism, has also shaped governance networks. Faced with a low degree of 
civil society organization in new policy issues, state agencies have resorted to 
what Bütschi and Cattacin (1993) termed “reflexive subsidiarity,” that is, when 
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the state (financially) supports the establishment of voluntary associations, 
which it then invites to join governance networks and play a substantial role 
in the implementation of state policies. This strongly echoes the instrumental 
conjecture in which governance networks are seen as a resource to power-
ful state actors. However, closer analysis shows that even though voluntary 
associations are state creatures in origin, their involvement in governance 
networks enables them to gain sufficient momentum and autonomy to resist 
state intervention, and they have even been able to triumph over attempts to 
weaken them (Neuenschwander, 2005).
The Power of Elected Politicians in Governance Networks
Governance networks in Switzerland come in many different forms, and 
there are no overall rules on how actors that participate relate to one another. 
Transparency of governance networks is generally poor. Unlike representa-
tive institutions, there is no statutory right for public scrutiny with respect to 
decision-making bodies of governance networks. Case studies of drug policy, 
public transport, cultural policy, and water provision have shown that lines 
of accountability are blurred in governance networks (Kübler & Schwab, 
2007). The budgetary process seems to provide the main link for connecting 
governance networks to both elected politicians in representative institutions 
as well as the electorate through direct democratic instruments (Wälti, Kübler, 
& Papadopoulos, 2004). Legal procedures for budget or credit approval 
generally stipulate a cascade of decisions by different bodies (the executive, 
parliament, electorate) according to the amount that is involved. Because 
the delivery of public policies by governance networks generally involves a 
transfer of public funds, the procedures for budget approval provide the main 
link to the democratic sphere.
These findings are in line with the dominant discourse about the role of 
elected politicians in public policy making. The wave of public management 
reform that swept Switzerland in the 1990s (re)defined the role of elected 
politicians. Echoing Osborne and Gaebler’s (1993) famous distinction be-
tween steering and rowing, one of the characteristic features of new public 
management, Swiss style, consists in separating strategic aspects of decision 
making from operational aspects of administrative execution (Germann, 1999; 
Schedler, 2000). This redefines the role of the elected politicians, be they 
national or local: Whereas operational choices are left to the discretion of the 
bureaucracy (or governance networks), strategic choices are the privilege of 
elected politicians who are thereby transformed into metagovernors.
However, the accuracy of this view has been heavily questioned in the 
Swiss context. On a conceptual level, Germann (1999) refuted it as a revival 
of an outdated dogma from the American Progressive era according to which 
politics should be clearly separated from administration. Given that “the mix-
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ing up of politics and administration has a long secular tradition and is deeply 
anchored in Swiss institutions of direct democracy” (Germann 1999, p. 209), 
this redefined role of elected politicians seems all the more inadequate. In 
a similar way, others have argued that separating strategic from operational 
decision making weakens representative institutions and will, ultimately, result 
in the repoliticizing of implementation processes (see, in particular, Knoepfel, 
1996). Recent empirical research (Widmer & Rieder, 2007; Widmer & Rüegg, 
2005) has shown that, indeed, elected politicians in Switzerland do not confine 
themselves to the role of metagovernors. Rather, they do not hesitate to behave 
as microgovernors by interfering in administrative processes. The public bu-
reaucracy is often subject not only to scrutiny by elected politicians but also 
to governance networks that perform functions in support of particular policy 
programs. In the social policy field, Wälti et al. found “little evidence that 
governance [networks] tend to uncouple political issues from the traditional 
arenas of democratic legitimization and from public debate” (2004, p. 106). 
Reduced influence by elected politicians in governance networks has thus not 
been diagnosed in Switzerland. This situation is best understood within the 
complementarity conjecture, emphasizing that ultimate decision authority 
remains with elected politicians.
conclusion
The context of negotiation democracy in a heterogeneous and fragmented so-
ciety has provided a favorable climate to governance networks in Switzerland 
ever since. Governance networks appear as a functional addition to the existing 
consociational arrangements. Even though governance networks have become an 
instrument for the state to expand into new policy fields, there are strong limits to 
state discretion, as even weak voluntary associations have successfully resisted 
outright instrumentalization. In terms of democratic anchorage, governance 
networks in Switzerland are best described by the complementary conjecture. 
Indeed, legal procedures—especially the budgetary process—provide systematic 
linkages of governance networks to decision making in representative institu-
tions. In addition, elected politicians have proved quite reluctant to embrace 
the new role of metagovernors foreseen by public management reforms. The 
evidence suggests that decisional authority of representative institutions has not 
been reduced by the proliferation of governance networks.
The Netherlands
The origins of Network Governance
The Netherlands has traditionally been a society of pillars (Socialist, Protes-
tant, Catholic, Liberal), each having its own organizational structures (political 
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parties, intermediate organizations) that operate relatively separately from the 
others (Lijphart, 1999). As in Switzerland, decision making in the Netherlands 
was based on a high degree of passivity and loyalty on the part of citizens 
and close contact between the elites of the political parties and third-sector 
(societal) associations. Thus, strong elite leadership by the political leaders 
of the pillars was combined with strong consensualism between leaders and 
strong associationalism, which is densely organized social life within the 
pillars. Implementation was left to the societal organizations in each of the 
political pillars, which were closely affiliated with the political parties.
This system of decision making lasted until the end of the 1960s. Since 
then the Netherlands has witnessed a strong secularization process, during 
which the traditional pillars lost their meaning (Hendriks & Toonen, 2000) and 
polarization increased. The growth of the welfare state resulted in groups of 
actors who specialize in particular sectors entering the decision-making process 
(Koppenjan et al., 1987; Van den Berg & Molleman, 1975; Van Putten, 1982). 
This process created knowledge and resource interdependencies among public, 
private, and semiprivate actors. In addition, there has been a growing need for 
integrated solutions for problems that surpass sectors. The result has been a 
more complex form of decision making, which can be regarded as governance 
networks, operating at national, regional, and local levels.
The increasing importance of governance networks is also shown by 
the growing number of interactive decision-making processes in Dutch 
municipalities and occasionally at the national level (see Denters, van 
Heffen, Huisman, & Klok, 2003; Edelenbos & Monninkhof, 2001). Here, 
stakeholders are invited to participate in the decision-making process in an 
early phase (before solutions are developed) (see Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006; 
Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000).
The relationship to the Dutch Democratic milieu
The evidence about the emergence of governance networks in the Netherlands, 
taken over the longer term, suggests that the network character of decision 
making increases, as does the involvement of additional actors. This trend 
toward governance networks also fits the Dutch political administrative system 
(a decentralized unitary state) in which local governments have consider-
able power, but there is also regular negotiation between central and local 
public bodies. This points to the transitional conjecture in which the already 
consociational democratic and political system of the Netherlands is slowly 
converted to something whose whole contour we cannot yet see but could be 
considered a network democracy.
However, there are trends that do not fit this picture and indicate the 
incompatibility conjecture. These include the strong call for leadership by 
citizens and discussion of ways to curtail the involvement of external actors 
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(and especially their legal rights) so that decision making on complex issues 
can be speeded up. These trends suggest a tension between the rules and 
requirements of governance networks, which focus on mutual interaction, 
negotiation, and the development of shared commitment by actors and the more 
vertical accountability structure of representational democracy (Klijn, 2008). 
This also fits with the trend of the past 10 years in which public confidence 
in political parties and political leaders has diminished and social discontent 
has risen (Dekker, van der Meer, Schyns, & Steenvorden, 2009).
The large number of actors involved in governance networks reduces their 
transparency. However, different accountability mechanisms are developed 
before or during decision-making processes, and democratic legitimacy is 
achieved in various ways, including public hearings, collective agreements 
on processes, and normal democratic procedures.
Governance Networks and Elected Politicians
In the formal sense, representative political institutions still hold considerable 
power because sooner or later most decisions have to pass these institutions, 
and elected city officials usually have strong positions in the networks. How-
ever, this view of a complementarity conjecture is challenged by research that 
shows that the authority of representational bodies is weaker than their formal 
position suggests (Edelenbos, 2000; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006; Edelenbos & 
Monninkhof, 2001). Although political bodies are involved in designing the 
rules for interactive decision making, they are frequently absent from the 
process itself. In addition, research on environmental projects shows that there 
is no correlation between the involvement of political bodies or political par-
ties and project outcomes, but there is a relatively strong correlation between 
the involvement of stakeholders and positive outcomes (Edelenbos, Steijn, 
& Klijn, 2010). This suggests that stakeholders do significantly contribute to 
outcomes in governance networks, and so it could be argued that, for them, 
networks are understood within the instrumental conjecture. This leads to a 
“displacement of politics” in which important decisions are framed and made 
in places other than in the institutions of representative government. The 
stronger duality installed at the turn of the century in Dutch politics, which 
led city and provincial councils to concentrate more on a controlling task, 
may have contributed to a less prominent role of elected bodies and a more 
prominent role of individual elected officials.
conclusion
Superficially, the emergence of governance networks seems to fit the typical 
Dutch consociationalism style of policy making in which actors negotiate with 
one another. However, they do give political organizations and representa-
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tive government a less prominent position in the whole process, even though 
their formal position is still strong. In that sense, the transitional conjecture 
seems a reasonable model to describe and explain the developments. There 
are also, however, signs that indicate tensions between governance networks 
and representative democracy, especially as the traditional pillarized model 
has lost significance. It is as yet unclear whether this can be explained as a 
sign that the transition is not always smooth or more fundamentally reflects 
the incompatibility conjecture.
Denmark
origins of Governance Networks
Denmark has a long history of a very strong state and a very strong civil society 
(Knudsen, 1991), and governance networks have served as a means to bridge 
these sectors, resolve conflicts, and enhance cooperation and coordination 
through the shaping of negotiated agreements. In policy areas such as labor 
market policy and agriculture, a strong corporatist tradition of networking 
between the state and the relevant interest organizations has prevailed and in 
policy areas such as education, social services, culture, and sports, there is 
an even longer tradition of negotiated network cooperation between public 
actors and a broad variety of voluntary organizations (Bogason, 1990; 2000). 
However, since the beginning of the 1980s, the systematic use of governance 
networks has spread into new policy areas such as business, tourism, regional 
development, environment, health, and education, and they have become more 
institutionalized and legitimized (Bogason, 2001; Sørensen, 2006).
Although governance networks have a central place at the national and local 
levels, the role that they play varies. National networks are predominantly en-
gaged in policy making while local networks focus on policy implementation. 
However, because Denmark has a constitutionally guaranteed local level of 
government with a considerable degree of political competence and autonomy, 
local governance networks are also in many instances engaged in local policy 
making. National and local governance networks take many different forms. 
Some are relatively informal while others are formal; some networks are open 
and inclusive while others are closed and exclusive; some are initiated from 
below while others are initiated from above; some are metagoverned by public 
authorities while others are not.
One driving force behind the growth in governance networks is a posi-
tive view of their value among leading politicians and public administrators, 
notably the Ministry of Finance and the Association of Danish Municipalities 
(Christiansen & Nørgaard, 2003; Sørensen, 2006). They see the involvement 
of stakeholders in public governance as a means of providing more informed 
decisions, promoting efficient implementation by reducing stakeholder resis-
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tance, and increasing governance legitimacy by improving the responsiveness 
of the political system vis-à-vis central stakeholders.
The relationship to the Democratic milieu in Denmark
Denmark is characterized not only by a strong state and a strong civil society 
but by a strong national and local representative democracy and a strong 
participatory democracy. Seen in this context, governance networks can be 
understood within the complementary conjecture as a way of linking national 
and local levels of representative democracy with various forms of democratic 
participation. This complementary view is expressed by a growing number of 
national politicians (Christiansen & Nørgaard, 2003) and citizens (Andersen, 
Torpe, & Andersen, 2000) and in the concluding report of the Danish National 
Study of Power and Democracy (Togeby, Anderson, Christiansen, Jørgensen, 
& Vallgårda, 2003).
Networks that are initiated and regulated by public authorities can also be 
understood to some extent within the instrumental conjecture as a new and 
more efficient means of implementing public policy. However, it seems to be 
generally accepted that to be efficient governance networks need a considerable 
amount of autonomy and a considerable ability to affect the outcome of the 
processes of public governance in which they are involved. For that reason, 
governance networks are not seen as neutral instruments for implementing 
public policies but as active coproducers of public policy that have a direct 
effect on the policy outcome. In other words, governance networks tend to 
be seen both as a form of governance and as a form of policy making that 
needs to be regulated democratically. Accordingly, one of the central debates 
in the Danish context concerns how representative democracy and democratic 
network participation are to complement each other.
The transparency and accountability of Danish governance networks vary 
considerably. Formalized governance networks tend to be more transparent 
and accountable than informal networks. This is, among other things, because 
formal networks are often metagoverned by public authorities in a way that 
contributes to ensuring some extent of openness and broad inclusion in their 
constitution and some degree of publicity and public attention. Informal 
governance networks are often less visible to the larger public and thus 
more difficult for public authorities and the larger public to hold to account. 
However, experience shows that deliberate efforts to metagovern informal 
governance networks can increase their transparency and accountability 
(Sørensen, 2007).
One of the major barriers for increasing the transparency and accountability 
of governance networks, however, is the narrow perception of the media on 
where and how politics is performed. The narrow media focus on the traditional 
political institutions of representative democracy means that they show little 
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interest in the political role of governance networks. The effect is a low level 
of publicity and, hence, limited transparency and accountability of formal as 
well as informal governance networks.
Governance Networks and Elected Politicians
When focusing on the role of elected politicians, the relationship between 
governance networks and representative democracy is best understood within 
the transitional conjecture as the increased institutionalization of the role of 
governance networks goes hand in hand with a gradual transformation of the 
role of elected politicians. Hence, the role of national as well as municipal 
politicians has gradually been redefined from that of sovereign decision mak-
ers to metagovernors who govern through the framing of different forms of 
self-governance, with network governance being one of them (Berg, 2000; 
Sørensen, 2006). This new image of what it means to be a politician, which 
is, among other things, promoted by the new public management doctrine, 
suggests that politicians should not get involved in details and concrete gover-
nance affairs. Rather, they should concentrate on defining the overall political 
and budgetary goals that self-governing actors should pursue. The power of 
this new ideal typical image of what it means to be a good politician is illu-
minated by the fact that there are strong criticisms of politicians for being too 
occupied by detail and concrete governance issues. In the Danish context, the 
current efforts to reformulate the role of national and local politicians has led 
to a considerable reduction in their influence on public policy processes. This 
is because the character and amount of the resources that Danish politicians 
have access to in their effort to exercise metagovernance are limited, leaving 
considerable space for the public administrators (Sørensen, 2006).
conclusion
The strong tradition of close cooperation between public authorities and 
civil society and the presence of strong constitutionally ensured local politi-
cal institutions has led to the formation of a plurality of national and local 
governance networks that function as a supplement to the national and local 
institutions of representative democracy. However, the recent growth in the 
number and importance of governance networks has to an increasing extent 
transformed the institutions of representative democracy through a gradual 
reinterpretation of the role of public authorities from that of being sovereign 
decision makers into being metagovernors that govern at a distance and leaves 
considerable autonomy to self-regulating governance networks and institu-
tions. Seen from a transitional perspective on democracy, the development 
of a new role to politicians is promising, but it is problematic that Danish 
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politicians seem to end up playing a marginal role in the metagovernance of 
governance networks and that the transparency and accountability of many 
governance networks tend to be relatively low.
CoNClUSioN
Our analysis of the democratic anchorage of governance networks in four 
European countries confirms that there is substantial cross-national variation 
in the relationship between governance networks and representative institu-
tions (see Table 4). In the United Kingdom, governance networks are used 
by the central state for its own purposes to deliver public policy locally with 
only marginal reference to elected representatives. In Switzerland, although 
governance networks operate in the shadow of consociationalism and largely 
outside public scrutiny, elected officials do have important influence over these 
networks through oversight of budgetary processes. In the Netherlands, gover-
nance networks have evolved over time to become an increasingly important 
element of pluralist policy making and implementation but so far retaining a 
clear link to democratic authorities for purposes of accountability. In Denmark, 
governance networks have become institutionalized as coproducers of policy 
and services, and there is a productive relationship between representative 
and participatory democracy.
The case studies also highlight the importance of the varying national con-
text in shaping the democratic anchorage of governance networks. The focus 
on two elements of democratic milieu—namely, patterns of democracy and 
the strength of associationalism—allows us to establish the degree of cross-
national variation more systematically. First, it seems that the relationship 
of governance networks to representative institutions is strongly shaped by 
what Lijphart (1999) called patterns of democracy. There are striking parallels 
between Switzerland and the Netherlands: Both countries are traditionally 
characterized by consociationalism. Power sharing is widespread, and gov-
ernance networks have been worked into the traditional views and practices 
of cooperative policy making between the state, corporate interests and civil 
society actors. A similar situation is found in Denmark, where governance 
networks are rooted in a long-standing means of enhancing state–civil society 
cooperation. In these three countries, governance networks are not considered 
incompatible with preexisting patterns of decision making and policy delivery. 
Governance networks are nothing new in this respect; they simply extend 
preexisting practices into new areas and blend well with existing patterns of 
democracy. The United Kingdom presents a totally different picture. There, 
the emergence of governance networks is a result of a top-down moderniza-
tion agenda by the national government, soon supported by a convergence of 
interest at the subnational level (involving local politicians, public officials, 
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business, community, and nonprofits). In contrast to the three other countries, 
governance networks there are something new; they disrupt the usual pattern 
of decision making, centered on power concentration at the level of (national) 
representative institutions.
Second, the relationship between governance networks and representative 
institutions also appears to be shaped by the vibrancy of the associational 
nexus that also varies across countries. There are, again, interesting similari-
ties and differences. Particularly striking is the case of the United Kingdom, 
where weak associationalism has resulted in a limited ability of governance 
networks to resist instrumentalization by the government’s modernization 
agenda. Attempts to instrumentalize governance networks were also discern-
ible in Switzerland, which is equally characterized by weak associationalism. 
In both cases, the government provided funds for capacity building (i.e., to 
help create nongovernmental actors from scratch) to associate them into 
governance networks. The case studies suggest that instrumentalization suc-
ceeded in the United Kingdom but not in Switzerland. While less discernible 
in the Netherlands or in Denmark, attempts at instrumentalization have not 
succeeded there either. Although in Switzerland successful resistance of 
governance networks to instrumentalization is basically due to the weakness 
of governmental actors, in the Netherlands and Denmark, it can be attributed 
to the strength of the civil society.
Taken together, these two contextual factors interact to produce peculiar 
relationships between governance networks and representative institutions. 
In the United Kingdom, the instrumental conjecture prevails. Although 
democratic oversight is limited, the power of elected politicians does not 
seem to be very much at stake, thanks to power concentration at the level of 
(national) representative institutions that behave as higher-order metagov-
ernors and, due to associational weakness, are able to effectively instrumen-
talize governance networks. At the other end of the spectrum, governance 
networks in Switzerland appear to be just another locus of consociational 
power sharing. Switzerland’s situation is due to the weakness of representa-
tive institutions—in the wider context of consensual patterns of decision 
making—and the weakness of governance networks due to weak associa-
tionalism. This explains why the complementarity conjecture prevails. In the 
two other cases, the Netherlands and Denmark, governance networks play an 
important role in a more general transformation of decision-making patterns. 
In both countries, strong associationalism can be seen as a major driver for 
this transformation. In the Netherlands, strong governance networks in the 
context of a negotiating state facilitated tendencies toward pluralism and 
helped to break up corporatist decision making. In Denmark, the growing 
importance of governance networks and the involvement of civil-society 
actors into policy making relates to a more general process of transforming 
Danish democracy altogether. In both countries, the transitional conjecture 
SKElchEr ET Al. 33
prevails, as governance networks were strong enough to transform decision 
making and redefine democratic practice.
These results from the four country studies also allow us to draw conclu-
sions on the accuracy of the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical section 
regarding the likeliness of the four conjectures to occur in different democratic 
milieus. More precisely, we find that in a context of weak associationalism, 
the instrumental conjecture is likely to prevail in majoritarian democracies 
(United Kingdom) and the complementary conjecture in consensual democra-
cies (Switzerland). In a context of strong associationalism (Denmark and the 
Netherlands), governance networks contribute to redefining and transforming 
democratic decision making and thus make the transitional conjecture more 
likely. In the cases under scrutiny here, the prevailing transitional conjecture 
certainly has to do with the background of the consensual patterns of power 
sharing that is present in both countries. Hence, we are as yet unable to assess 
whether, in a majoritarian democracy characterized by strong associationalism, 
the incompatibility conjecture is more likely than any other. Nevertheless, the 
analysis of the Netherlands can be viewed as a case in point (more majoritar-
ian than Denmark) as the case study suggests that here, the incompatibility 
conjecture, although not prevailing, is present to some extent, as people call 
for stronger leadership by democratically elected politicians.
This four-country analysis has also revealed the dynamic nature of the 
context or democratic milieu in which governance networks operate. This has 
implications for the relationship between governance networks and democratic 
anchorage as indicated by the conjectural possibilities associated with the 
current and future conditions identified for each of our cases. Interestingly, 
the case studies show how countries operating in very different political 
contexts (United Kingdom and Switzerland) offer the same combination of 
conjectures (instrumental and complementary) and how countries with rather 
longer experience of governance networks but more similar political cultures 
(Denmark and the Netherlands) share concerns about the potential end point 
of the developments in governance networks, that is, the possibility that the 
transitional position will lead to incompatibility if matters of democratic 
anchorage cannot be addressed.
The normative implication of our study is that researchers into modes 
of governance need to pay more attention to the contextual features of the 
empirical cases they are studying and, in so doing, to frame their conclusions 
with reference to relevant features of that context. Context is often used as 
a residual category to explain that which cannot be explained otherwise. We 
define context in a particular way—as the democratic milieu—and thus en-
able it to have more analytical purchase. Our article shows one way in which 
context could be included in cross-national comparative research, but there 
are other possibilities that draw on the rich interpretivist tradition in the study 
of public policy and governance.
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